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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Nanotechnology, the science of controlling the structure of matter at the nanoscale, is expected to 
provide the platform and tools for innovative products and applications for consumers while adding 
value to solutions designed to address a myriad of human and environmental challenges. This has 
triggered agents within government and industry to invest heavily in nanotechnology research and 
development programs [27, 43]. The results of this investment are steadily coming to fruition, as 
evidenced by the increasing number of products incorporating nanomaterials making their way into 
commerce [87]. In 2001 the US National Science Foundation (NSF) predicted that by 2015, the 
value of products and services that will incorporate nanotechnology will go up to $US1 trillion [76] 
There are also reports suggesting that the potential market value for products incorporating 
nanotechnology (specifically in the semiconductors and electronics sectors) could go up to $US2.6 
trillion by 2014, and US$2.8 trillion by 2015 (driven by the expected commercialization success in 
the healthcare and electronics sectors) [5, 81]. A detailed summary of the published market figures 
regarding nanotechnology is provided by Malanowski and Zweck [60: 1811].  
It is important to note that estimations on the potential future of the nano market have 
generated many debates amongst scholars. A number of them criticize these estimations on the 
grounds that the size of the nano market is “over-hyped” by news media and key actors [25, 43]. 
Others indicate that current estimations on the potential of the nano market are ambiguous due to 
uncertainties related to the size of the “nanotechnology value chain” and the “(sub)areas of 
nanotechnology that the market evaluation includes” [60, 80:54]. These debates have led to a wide 
range of perspectives and a lack of consensus amongst scholars about the potential of the future 
nano market.  
Concomitant to these debates have been concerns over the unintended consequences, the 
environmental health and safety risks that nanotechnology may pose to workers handling 
nanomaterials, to consumers of nanobased products, and to the public and the environment at large. 
Maynard and his colleagues [64], have already indicated that some engineered nanoparticles (ENPs) 
such as carbon nanotubes and other bio persistent-insoluble nanoparticles such as titanium dioxide 
may under certain conditions present toxicological hazard to humans and the environment. One of 
the main issues is that the unique characteristics of nanomaterials followed by rapid advancement 
and commercialization of nanoscience, have challenged the application of risk and toxicological 
assessment methodologies, and regulatory oversight strategies outlined in current environmental, 
health and safety regulations [16, 20]. Scientific reviews, such as those carried out by the United 
Kingdom’s Royal Commission on Environmental Protection in 2008 [77] and the Center for 
International Environmental Law in 2012 [8], emphasize that there are continues scientific and 
knowledge gaps on the hazardous components, the specific properties and the behaviour of 
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nanomaterials on the environment or in living organisms. As such, formulating even small 
components of hard regulatory frameworks for nanotechnology remains difficult. Some jurisdictions 
(e.g. France; Australia; California) have already begun to tweak their existing command and control 
frameworks in relation to new industrial nanomaterials [6, 37, 79]. In addition, the European 
Parliament and Council have adopted a more wholesale approach with the introduction of nano-
specific provisions for cosmetics as part of the recast of the Cosmetic Regulation [15]. However, the 
vast majority of countries have opted to retain the regulatory status quo. This is not surprising given 
the evolving state of the scientific art and the uncertainties that surround so many facets of the 
technology. 
Scientific reports authored by Davies and Azouley have added to the broader policy and 
regulatory debate [8, 20]. These authors argue that the application of risk and toxicological 
assessment methodologies and regulatory oversight strategies outlined in current environmental, 
health, and safety regulations are inappropriate and too inflexible to cope with the rapid 
advancements and the potential risks of nanoscience. At the other hand of the spectrum, other 
reports such as those issued by the OECD [70], emphasize that existing approaches for the testing 
and assessment of traditional chemicals are in general adequate to deal with nanotechnology and 
only in some cases they may have to be adapted to the specificities of nanomaterials. Accordingly, 
the debate on how to embrace nanotechnology developments continues among policy makers, while 
the public and private sectors have voiced fears of the potential for under - and over - regulation.1  
Whereas consensus amongst regulators and policy makers on the most appropriate 
regulatory response remains elusive, a number of stakeholders coming from the industry, non-
governmental bodies and other public/private sectors, have joint forces to address and respond to the 
regulatory challenges of nanotechnology. These actors have focused on the development and 
implementation of voluntary governance arrangements and innovative measurement techniques. 
These arrangements are voluntary, non-binding and utilize the expertise of a wide range of 
governmental, industrial and civil society actors. The involvement of multiple actors, knowledgeable 
experts and epistemic communities in one regulatory setting are considered the key elements that 
shape the governing authority of these arrangements [1, 9, 10, 73]. Furthermore, many scholars 
argue that these arrangements provide for voluntary rules or guidelines that are continuously revised 
to provide the most up-to-date information on technology developments and cope with situations of 
regulatory uncertainty  [2, 4, 22, 32, 35, 73]. As such they are expected to be able to respond quickly 
to the speed, complexity and uncertainty of nanotechnology’s development.  
The landscape of these arrangements is very broad. For instance, at the national level we can 
observe actors such as DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) in the UK; 
EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) in the US; Friends of the Earth in Australia, whose main 
objective has been to develop “voluntary reporting schemes” or “stewardship programs” to gather 
scientific data on the characteristics and toxicity of engineered nanomaterials from relevant 
organisations and assist regulators with developing appropriate risk management frameworks for 
nanoscale materials [14]. Voluntary initiatives have also been initiated by private actors, such as the 
Responsible NanoCode in the UK; BASF in Germany as well as DuPont-Environmental Defense in 
the USA. The main objective of these developments has been (amongst others) to develop “in-
house” innovative regulatory mechanisms that govern the manufacture of nanoproducts; manage 
occupational, health and safety risks associated with the development of nanotechnology across all 
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 Both US and European Union key bodies including, for example, the US Executive Office of the President and the 
European Commission claim that the existing regulations covering chemicals and materials, as well as environmental and 
health issues are adequate to deal with nanotechnologies.  
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lifecycle phases; and ensure the responsible development, production, use and disposal of nanoscale 
materials (e.g. BASF NanoCode; DuPont NanoRisk Framework) [4, 14, 17, 34, 61].  
There are several voluntary initiatives taken at the European level as well. For instance the 
European Commission’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies 
Research emphasizes clearly the tendency of government to broaden their collaboration with 
industry and civil society, and provide a “tangible contribution to the good governance of 
nanotechnology” [13:478], CEN (the European Committee for Standardization) in 2005 set up a 
technical committee on nanotechnologies (TC352) - to develop consensus standards related to 
broader issues of nanotechnology, such as terminology and nomenclature, metrology and 
instrumentation, specifications for reference materials, test methodologies, science-based health, 
safety and environmental practices.  
However, the low number of submissions from relevant organisations and the industry [14, 
84], the failure of these initiatives to promote trust-building amongst key stakeholders, as well as the 
inability to disseminate effectively their activities [23], are considered major barriers for these 
arrangements to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, the global significance of the nanotechnology 
(scientific, regulatory and socio-environmental) issues and research, the evolvement of the new 
generations of nanomaterials and the rapid pace of commercialization, pose additional challenges for 
these voluntary arrangements to deal with this emerging and complex technology [3, 34]. 
Since the mid-2000 a wide range of transnational governance arrangements (TGAs) have 
emerged in the field of nanotechnology. By the term “transnational” we refer to “non-territorial 
policy making or interactions that cross national-borders at levels other than sovereign to sovereign” 
[39:2, 40:4]. We use the term transnational governance arrangement to refer to a set of 
rules/mechanisms within an institutional setting that influence the interaction between various actors 
(state and non-state actors not bounded by territorial borders), to provide for voluntary rules or 
guidelines grounded in practical experience and expertise. For instance, the two most important 
TGAs in the field of nanotechnology are the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development; despite its intergovernmental set-up) and the ISO (International Standardisation 
Organization) [17]. In addition, there are other public-private and private governance arrangements 
in which nanotechnology is discussed. These arrangements are mostly focused on a specific sector 
(e.g. nanomaterial safety) and have led to a range specific projects, workshops or dialogues. For 
instance, ICON (the International Council on Nanotechnology); IRGC (the International Risk 
Governance Council); and the ICCR (International Cooperation on Cosmetic Regulations). 
Intergovernmental initiatives that seek to contribute to nanotechnology related safety issues and 
foster the cooperation of scientists, policy-makers and industrial actors, are based on UN (United 
Nations) and WHO (World Health Organization) processes. For instance, UNIDO (the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization’s International Centre for Science and High 
Technology) and IFCS (the WHO’s intergovernmental forum on Chemical Safety) [17, 34].  
In many of these arrangements states have become only one type of participating actor 
amongst others in the decision-making process [62]. As such, they depart from traditional forms of 
regulation that are based on the exclusive authority of the nation state to make collectively binding 
decisions. They are based on different governance actors, networking strategies, processes and 
structures [41]. While these arrangements have received significant attention in political science, 
international relation (IR) theory and (international) law [56, 71, 82], the analytical questions 
provided by these studies are not fully complete. Current discussions focus mostly on explaining the 
differences between transnational arrangements and traditional state-based forms of regulation. 
However, they focus less on explaining the key factors that drive the emergence of these 
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arrangements.2 In these studies it is still unclear why certain arrangements have gained a leading role 
at transnational level or which arrangements are likely to have the highest potential to contribute to 
the governance of nanotechnology.3,4 What are their key attributes and power sources? This paper 
purports to further answer these questions.  
Building upon the regulatory challenges of nanotechnology, this paper analyzes the attributes 
and the potential of the key transnational nanotechnology governance arrangements, which provide 
forums of debate at transnational level and contribute to establishing informal coordination 
mechanisms. In particular, our focus is on: ISO/TC229 (ISO Technical Committee on 
Nanotechnology); OECD/WPMN (OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials); IFCS; 
IRGC and ICON  
There are several reasons that justify our decision to focus on these arrangements. To begin 
with, these arrangements have displayed well-defined strategies and plans to develop voluntary 
mechanisms that are relevant to the governance of nanotechnology. In addition, there has been no 
formal delegation or legal mandate for these arrangements to contribute to the field of 
nanotechnology or set norms which can serve as reference points. However, all of them have 
managed to establish internal mandates by securing resources and collaboration with influential 
stakeholders and experts in the field. As a result, the value and the potential of these arrangements to 
the governance of nanotechnology has been acknowledged and quoted in various reports [61], policy 
documents [27, 31, 32], and scholarly debates [2, 61]. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we discuss the factors that have 
contributed to the emergence of TGAs and emphasize why these modes of governance are 
considered appropriate to respond to the nanotechnology regulatory challenges. In the second 
section, we introduce a typology that distinguishes governance arrangements on the basis of actors 
involved, as well as the functions and the regulatory stages in which the arrangements contribute. 
We emphasize that TGAs can be characterized not only by these attributes, but also by their degree 
of institutionalization5 as well as the normative and substantive depth of transnational outcomes. In 
the third section, we assess the characteristics and the potential of the five aforementioned 
transnational nanotechnology governance arrangements. With these cases we demonstrate that the 
typology developed in this paper is useful to study the evolution of transnational governance in the 
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 Exceptions are the studies of: Abbott, W. K., Marchant, E.G. and Sylvester, J.D. (2006). A Framework Convention for 
Nanotechnology?” Environmental Law Review. 36, pp. 10931-42 ; Abbott, W. K. and Snidal, D. (2009). Strengthening 
International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, 42, pp. 501, 506–07; Abbott, W.K., Sylvester, J.D. and Marchant, E.G. (2010). 
Transnational regulation of nanotechnology: Reality or romanticism?, eds Hodge, A.G., Bowman, M.D. and Maynard, 
D. A., “International Handbook on Regulating Nanotechnologies”, (Edward Elgar, UK, USA), pp. 525-545.  
3
 Yet, in legal science a debate was started on the reasons explaining a shift from formal legal agreements to informal 
arrangements, including transnational actors. It has been argued that this can partly be explained by: (a) saturation with 
the existing treaties and changed policy preferences of States; (b) deep societal changes that are not unique to 
international law but affect both international and national legal systems, in particular: the transition towards an 
increasingly diverse network society; and (c) an increasingly complex knowledge society. See: Pauwelyn, J., Wessel, 
R.A. and Wouters, J. (2014). When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 
European Journal of International Law, pp.11-34. 
4
 Governance refers to “the systems of authoritative norms, rules, institutions, and practices by means of which any 
collectivity, from the local to the global, manages its common affairs”. In this way, as Ruggie argues, in the absence of 
government, transnational governance can be defined as an instance of governance. See: Ruggie, G. H. (2014). Global 
Governance and New Governance Theory: Lessons from Business and Human Rights. Global Governance: A Review of 
Multilateralism and International Organizations. 20 (1), p.5. 
5
 For more information on the institutionalization of regulatory networks see also: Berman, A. and Wessel, R.A. (2012). 
The International Legal Status of Informal International Law-making Bodies: Consequences for Accountability, eds. 
Pauwelyn, J., Wessel, R.A. and Wouters, J., “Informal International Lawmaking”, (Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp. 
35-62. 
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field of nanotechnology. Specifically, it allows us to understand and investigate the actions taken by 
various arrangements to enhance their capacity to contribute effectively to the governance of 
nanotechnology. The last section provides analysis and concluding remarks.  
 
1.2. THE TRANSNATIONALISATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE  
 
There seems to be a general consensus amongst scholars that the internationalization of markets, the 
emergence of transnational communication networks as well as new technologies have challenged 
the ability of national governments to define and provide public goods [57]. Hence, the creation of 
new forms of governance arrangements has been steadily increasing in part as a result of the 
limitations of the command and control regulation [41]. The proliferation of TGAs in the field of 
nanotechnology can be related to several political, regulatory and technological factors. 
 First, over the last few decades nanotechnology has emerged as a new transformative force 
in industrial society, covering a broad range of applications in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
electronics, energy, goods and cosmetics. Therefore, this emerging technology has attracted the 
attention of a wide range of actors coming from regulatory, civil society and business organisations 
whose activities span beyond national borders [3, 61]. Nanoscience and nanotechnology have also 
attracted a tremendously diverse range of skilled scientists,6 who contribute to the creation of new 
products/services and advice for any innovation in nanotechnology. As a result, nanotechnology 
governance has become highly exposed to the direct influence and initiatives of nonstate actors. 
Second, commerce generally and nanotechnology specifically are increasingly global in 
nature [3,4]. The experience with other technology developments on genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) and regulatory failures associated with asbestos, have led to many debates on how to 
develop appropriate and congruent governance frameworks for nanotechnologies [11, 36, 86].  
There are many considerations that support a transnational approach to the regulation of 
nanotechnology. Abbot and other colleagues [3:539-541], argue that a transnational approach to 
nanotechnology regulation can contribute to providing better opportunities for dialogue and learning 
by which harmonized regulatory requirements could be established for product testing, risk 
assessment, reporting and labeling. Harmonized requirements would in turn assist producers, 
manufacturers and distributors to benefit at the product level, and regulators to avoid regulation that 
is ill-informed or too stringent [3: 541]. In addition, it will assist multinational companies at the 
manufacturing level to deal with environmental and occupational health and safety issues. A 
transnational approach to these issues can lead to uniform compliance requirements, product 
stewardship, worker training and reporting programs [3, 11, 17, 34]. Furthermore, the global reach 
of nanotechnology research and trade provide additional incentives for developing regulatory 
frameworks at transnational level, which are expected to facilitate commerce, underpin good 
industrial practice and avoid regional divide [3, 34].  
Third, whereas nanotechnology is surrounded by great expectations, scientific evidence 
indicates that with the ongoing expansion of nanotechnology, novel nanostructures causing 
unknown forms of hazard can be produced [17:12]. As emphasized in the previous section, 
regulators are facing profound challenges and uncertainties about the adequacy of the existing risk 
assessment and management frameworks to characterize and assess accurately the risks associated 
with nanotechnology. The rapid pace of commercialization followed by the evolvement of new 
generations of nanomaterials pose additional challenges to the current regulatory frameworks to deal 
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 Most of these scientists have expertise in physics, chemistry, biology, information technology, toxicology, engineering 
and materials science.  
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with emerging technologies [84]. Regulatory systems are expected to face several challenges, which 
relate mainly to their ability to: a) deal with novel materials and uncertain risks; b) anticipate and 
respond rapidly to the changing technological systems; c) develop frameworks that offer sufficient 
flexibility and adaptability; d) expand the scientific capacity to include a diversity of mixed experts 
from public and private sectors; and e) develop globally oriented information-gathering systems to 
cope with the globalisation of nanotechnology [20]. Given the fundamental nature of these 
challenges and the inability of the individual states to tackle these issues effectively, many scholars 
urge for transnational coordination and cooperation [3, 17, 18, 34, 35]. 
Finally, over the last decade, nanotechnology has exploded from a relatively narrow 
technical field, into an arena that has to cope with constitutionally recognized interests also. The 
development of nanotechnology involves issues related to health, environment, occupational safety, 
scientific research, technological development, national security and so on [22:131]. The potential of 
nanotechnology to manipulate properties at the nano scale (i.e. making materials stronger, thinner, 
more elastic and so forth) has made nanotechnology to impact almost every industrial sector [36]. 
However, the growing production and use of nanomaterials (in particular engineered nanomaterials) 
may increase the potential of exposure for workers, consumers and environment [66]. This has 
triggered representatives of various civil society/labor coalitions to become highly interested on the 
benefits and risks of nanomaterials, as well as on the regulatory responses addressing these issues 
[33, 61]. As a result, nanotechnology has experienced an evolving political landscape, with many 
countries, national regulators, socio-environmental actors and international organisations 
participating in voluntary (and often privately led) initiatives to promote the regulatory coordination 
of nanotechnology [1, 2, 3, 53]. These developments, we would argue, provide additional incentives 
for the emergence of transnational governance arrangements. In the following section we provide a 
typology for understanding the characteristics and the potential of various governance arrangements 
at the transnational level.  
 
1.3. TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS GENERALLY AND 
THEIR ATTRIBUTES  
 
Transnational governance arrangements are identified mostly as voluntary, informal and flexible 
arrangements beyond the nation state in which private actors are systematically engaged [39, 42, 
75]. These arrangements are horizontally structured, relatively institutionalized and bring together 
actors from various sectors to share information, best practices and harmonize rules and procedures 
in order to pursue certain goals in areas of limited statehood [18, 42, 55, 78]. Transnational 
arrangements come in different forms at transnational level. Whereas there is no single characteristic 
that would define transnational arrangements from the traditional modes of governance, Pauwelyn 
[71] indicates that new governance arrangements are characterized by:  
 
a) process informality (they build on the cross-border cooperation between public and private 
actors in a forum other than a traditional international organisation);  
b) actor informality (these arrangements build upon the cooperation of actors other than 
traditional diplomatic actors (e.g. regulators or agencies))7; and  
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 In is interesting to note that in these arrangements the governance contributions are not explicitly restricted to those 
actors whose organisational objective lies in the provision of certain public goals (e.g. regulators, humanitarian or 
environmental organisations). Rather, the authority of transnational governance arrangements might also emerge from 
various private actors, such as business associations, industry or multinational companies. See: Knill, Ch. and Lehmkuhl, 
D. (2002). Private Actors and the State: Internationalization and changing patterns of governance, Governance 5, p. 42. 
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c) output informality (these arrangements do not result in a formal treaty or legally enforceable 
commitment).  
 
These characteristics come close to the characteristics of the transnational new forms of governance 
that Abbot and Snidal have discussed earlier [1: 521]. In their framing new forms of governance are 
fundamentally distinguished from old governance models by:  
 
a) differing roles of the state in regulation (in new governance the state is a significant player, it 
acts as a facilitator for supporting voluntary and cooperative programs, rather than as a top-
down commander);  
b) decentralization of the regulatory authority (in new governance regulatory responsibilities 
are shared among different actors coming from the state agencies and private sectors);  
c) dispersed expertise (new governance seeks to harness the expertise of a wide range of actors; 
it looks beyond professional regulators and seeks to incorporate also those who may have 
‘local’ expertise on relevant issues); and  
d) non-mandatory rules (new governance relies on flexible norms and voluntary rules). 
  
In a similar vein, Börzel and Risse [10:196] argue that the more we enter the realm of new modes of 
governance, the more we decentralize the regulatory authority, include non-hierarchical forms of 
steering and share the regulatory responsibilities amongst public and private actors.8 As a result, 
various forms of governance arrangements have emerged at trasnantional level encompassing 
different actors, modes of steering, processes and outcomes [41:6]. Therefore, a typology of 
transnational governance arrangements is important to understand their key features and their 
potential to respond to regulatory issues [7, 10]. 
 Scholars have proposed various typologies painting the key features of transnational 
governance arrangements. To begin with Andonova and colleagues [7], propose a typology 
according to which governance arrangements be characterized on the basis of actors involved (types 
of actors) and functions. With regards to the types of actors, they argue that transnational 
arrangements involve a variety of state and nonstate actors that contribute different capacities and 
sources of authority. They distinguish between: 
 
a) private arrangements (established and managed by non-state actors only);  
b) public arrangements (established by public actors acting independently from the state); and 
c) hybrid arrangements (established by public and private actors jointly).  
 
 
 
However, the types of actors are considered as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
distinguishing amongst transnational arrangements. The authors argue that these arrangements 
should be clustered also in terms of the functions that they can or do perform. In their framing, 
“functions” determine the resources and the power used within a particular arrangement to steer 
members to achieve certain goals [7:62]. In principle, the functions of transnational governance 
arrangements are divided into five categories:  
 
a) information sharing (arrangements that influence political and civil discourse through 
learning forums or collaborative events);  
b) capacity building (arrangements that provide resources or institutional support through 
fundraising campaigns, sponsorship);  
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international negotiation systems); delegation (delegation of state functions to private actors); co-regulation (co-
regulation of public and private actors); self-regulation (private self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy). 
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c) coordination (arrangements that coordinate state and non-state activities in a particular 
sector);  
d) rule setting (arrangements that contribute to adopting international norms, regulations or 
standards that respond to respective regulatory problems); and  
e) implementation (arrangements that provide monitoring and service provision to enable action 
or implementation of national or international policy goals) [63]. 
 
A different approach is taken by Abbot and Snidal [2], who propose the concept of a governance 
triangle to depict the involvement of various actors (i.e. states, firms and NGOs) in a respective 
governance arrangement. Similar to the framework employed by Andonova et al [7], the typology of 
Abbott and Snidal focuses on rule-setting. These authors take a wider perspective and divide the rule 
setting (in the authors’ words – the regulatory process of standard setting) into five distinct phases:  
 
a) agenda-setting (ability of the arrangement to place an issue on the regulatory agenda);  
b) negotiations (ability of the arrangement to draft and promulgate standards);  
c) implementation (ability of the arrangement to contribute to the implementation of the 
standards);  
d) monitoring (ability of the arrangement to monitor compliance); and  
e) enforcement (ability of the arrangement to ensure effective compliance).  
 
Their basic premise is that in order for the transnational governance arrangements to succeed in the 
regulatory process they need a suite of competences, such as: independence from the targets of 
regulation, representativeness, expertise of several kinds and concrete operational capacity 
(including resources). However, since in most cases single-actor schemes do not have all the 
necessary competencies, they contend that collaboration with different types of actors is essential for 
these schemes to assemble the needed competencies and act effectively in the regulatory process. 
According to their line of argumentation, the potential of transnational arrangements can be 
understood by looking at the design choice of the governance arrangements – in particular at the 
relative input that states, NGOs and firms exercise in a respective arrangement and the actions taken 
by the governance arrangement to fulfill any competency deficit. Focusing on the regulatory 
standard-setting schemes of pre-and-post-1985, the authors observe a shift from old to newly 
emerging multi-actor schemes, characterized by high level of decentralization and dispersed 
expertise [2: 52-57]. Whereas these characteristics make these arrangements better suited to address 
regulatory gaps at transnational level, the authors suggest that some form of “facilitative state 
orchestration” is important to reduce the bargaining problems between firms and NGOs to achieve 
socially desirable outcomes [1: 573, 2]. 
In addition to types of actors and  functions, Abbott and his colleagues [4], Liese and 
Beishem [59], and Martens [63] suggest a typology for mapping the realm of transnational 
governance arrangements based on the level of institutionalization and the design choice. Martens 
notes that governance arrangements can be classified in low, medium and high levels of 
institutionalization [63]. Whereas high levels of institutionalization refer to permanent 
multistakeholder institutions that have formal membership, firmly established governing bodies, 
institutionalized rules of decision making, a secretariat and budget authority; medium levels of 
institutionalization have a clearly defined membership but not a separate legal status or formalized 
decision-making structures; and low levels of institutionalization are ad-hoc initiatives with narrowly 
defined objectives, no formalized membership or governing body. According to Homkes [42] and 
Martens [63] institutionalization and appropriate structural forms may be costly and time consuming 
to establish and maintain, but they are the key factors driving the norm-setting and decision making 
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powers of the governance arrangements. Scholars of transnational governance have also given 
increasing credence to the regulatory design - referring in particular to the stages of the regulatory 
process that the arrangement addresses, the relative precision of the rules (they frame this as 
normative scope), as well as the obligatory status of the transantional outcomes (they frame this as 
substantive depth) [4, 59]. 
In this way, the typology of transantional governance arrangements has become a complex 
and multidimensional phenomenon, which cannot be analyzed through one prism only [62]. To 
assess the potential of these arrangements one should understand how various attributes 
characterizing transnational arrangements interact with each other and contribute to the efficiency of 
the arrangement [4]. In Table 1.1. we show the key attributes of transantional governance 
arrangements, which can be used to categorize them into various groups and assess their potential in 
a structured way. In the following section we apply these attributes to understand the landscape and 
the potential of transantional governance arrangements in the field of nanotechnology.  
 
Table 1.1. The key attributes of transnational governance arrangements 
 
 
Actors 
Involved 
 
Functions 
 
Regulatory 
Process 
 
Degree of 
institutionalization 
 
Normative 
Scope 
 
Substantive 
Depth 
 
Public Actors 
(Single Actor 
Scheme) 
 
Information 
sharing 
 
Agenda-Setting 
 
Low Level 
 
Narrow 
 
Significant 
constraints 
 
Private Actors 
(Single Actor 
Scheme) 
 
Capacity 
building 
 
Negotiations 
 
Medium Level 
 
Broad 
 
Excessive 
Flexibility 
 
Public and 
Private Actors 
(Multi-Actor 
Scheme) 
 
Coordination 
 
Implementation 
 
High Level 
  
 Rule-Setting Monitoring  
Implementation Enforcement  
 
1.4 . THE GOVERNANCE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: A TYPOLOGY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS  
Since the mid-2000, various transnational governance arrangements have emerged to discuss 
nanotechnology. In the following we focus on five key arrangements and discuss their activities in 
the field of nanotechnology:  
1.4.1. ISO Technical Committee on nanotechnology (ISO/TC229): In January 2005, the 
ISO Technical Management Board (TMB) established a new technical committee focused 
specifically in developing nanotechnology standards (TC229). A technical committee that “would 
provide industry, research and regulators with a coherent set of robust and well founded standards in 
the area of nanotechnologies […] whilst at the same time providing regulators, and society in 
general, with suitable and appropriate instruments for the evaluation of risk and the protection of 
health and the environment” [44]. 
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In the first plenary meeting of the TC229 the scope of the Committee was articulated as well 
as the internal structure and the business plan. Kica and Bowman [53, 54], provide a detailed 
discussion on the internal structure of TC229. The main work in the TC229 is done by its Working 
Groups (WGs) [45]. The Committee allocates specific tasks to the WGs, which tasks are carried out 
by experts, who are individually appointed by a participating ISO member body, a liaison 
organisation, or both, to a particular WG when new projects are approved. TC229 consists of four 
WGs working on:  
 
a) Terminology and Nomenclature (WG1- develops uniform terminology and nomenclature for 
nanotechnologies to facilitate communication and promote common understanding); 
b)  Measurement and Characterization (WG2 - develops measurement and characterization 
standards for use by industry in nanotechnology-based products);  
c) Health, Safety and Environment (WG3 - develops science-based standards that aim to 
promote occupational safety, consumer protection and environmental protection); and 
d)  Measurement and Characterization (WG4 - develops standards that specify relevant 
characteristics of engineered nanoscale materials for use in specific applications) [46].  
 
Besides the central Secretariat leading the work of the TC229, each of the WGs has its secretaries 
and convenors who arrange the meetings and communicate important information to the 
participants.. The inclusion of various WG with different aims and objectives, emphasizes that 
TC229 has shifted the focus from working only on technical issues related to defining the size and 
concept of nanomaterials, to addressing broader aspects of the technology such as risk management, 
health, environment and safety issues [54].9 Following this evolution in the development of 
standards, in 2009 the former chair of the TC229 stated that ISO standards now serve three key 
objectives: a) supporting commercialization and market development; b) providing a basis for 
procurement through technical, quality and environmental management; and c) supporting 
appropriate legislation/regulation and voluntary governance structures [38]. Therefore, TC229 and 
its standards seem to have multiple functions. TC229 provides a forum for debate for various actors. 
Its “plenary week” meetings organized every tenth month of the year, as well as WG meetings 
provide the best opportunities for experts to meet with other delegates exchange knowledge and 
information on standardisation issues, and set appropriate and uniform standards.  
Regarding the representation of actors in TC229, it is important to note that nanotechnology 
standards are developed by groups of experts under the overarching TC umbrella. ISO applies the 
principle of national delegation and its administrative work takes place through a Secretariat located 
in one of the National Standardization Bodies (NSBs). Delegates participate in the ISO/TC meetings 
in negotiations and consultations that are intended to lead to the development of an international 
consensus. As indicated in the ISO/IEC Directives, all national bodies have the same rights to 
participate in the work of the committees and subcommittees [45]. TC229 has 34 participatory and 
13 observatory members.  
To ensure legitimacy through stakeholder representation, ISO has established procedures for 
including a wide-range of stakeholders in the process – not only the industrial ones [35]. Within ISO 
the participating actors are divided into: industry and trade associations; consumers and consumer 
associations; governments and regulators; as well as societal and other interests. In that sense, ISO 
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 In 2011 ISO/TC229 took a leading role to developing a guidance document related to labeling of nanomaterials, which 
complements the current regulatory initiatives on the labelling of food and cosmetic products containing manufactured 
nano-objects. An increasing focus on health, safety, and environmental issues appear to have provided TC229 with the 
impetus to publish ISO/TR12885 on Nanotechnologies - Health and Safety Practices in Occupational Settings Relevant 
to Nanotechnologies. 
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standardization process is considered as a multistakeholder process open to a variety of actors and 
experts. ISO/TC229 has a number of collaborations and relationships with other organisations and 
standardization bodies as well [21]. TC229 is opened to a broader range of stakeholders who are not 
connected with ISO through national bodies. These stakeholders are known as liaison members, and 
include manufacturer associations, commercial and professional associations, industrial consortia, 
user groups, as well as groups concerned with the rights of consumers workers and environment, 
(e.g. the European Consumer Voice in Standardisation (ANEC), the European Environmental 
Citizens Organisation for Standardisation (ECOS) and the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI)). 
Furthermore, as part of its outreach strategy ISO/TC229 has established two Task Groups working 
on Sustainability (TGS)10, as well as on Consumer and Societal Dimensions of Nanotechnologies 
(TGCSDN) [46].  
 Regarding the outcomes, as of start 2013, TC229 has published three standards, while the 
majority of deliverables have been normative and informative documents developed in the form of 
technical specifications (TSs) and technical reports (TRs).11 As articulated in the ISO/TC229 
business plan, the Committee has given priority to developing horizontal standards that “provide 
foundational support across all sectors that use nanotechnologies or nanomaterials” [46].12 These 
deliverables have no strict legal value nor provide for excessive constraints. However, they 
constitute important statements, provide concrete and practical information and address a broader 
range of products and activities.  
1.4.2. OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (OECD/WPMN): was 
established in 2006 to promote “international co-operation in human health and environmental 
safety related aspects of manufactured nanomaterials (MNs), in order to assist in the development of 
rigorous safety evaluation of nanomaterials” [69]. The WPMN work programme was adopted by the 
Chemicals Committee in November 2006 and focuses on three key working areas:  
 
a) Work Area 1 - which aims to develop working definitions for MNs for regulatory 
purposes within the context of environmental, health and safety (EHS) issues;  
b) Work Area 2 - which aims to encourage cooperation and coordination on risk assessment 
frameworks; and  
c) Work Area 3 - which aims to foster co-operation and share information on current and 
planned initiatives in risk assessment, risk management and regulatory frameworks [85]. 
 
To fulfill these overarching aims, WPMN has developed eight projects. These projects focus on:  
a) the development of an OECD Database on EHS research for approval (Project 1);  
b) the EHS research strategies on MNs (Project 2);  
c) the safety testing of a representative set of MNs and test guidelines (Project 3);  
d) MNs and test guidelines (Project 4);  
e) co-operation on voluntary schemes and regulatory programmes (Project 5);  
f) co-operation on risk assessments (Project 6);  
g) the role of alternative methods in nanotoxicology (Project 7);  
h) exposure measurement with an initial focus on occupational settings (Project 8) ; and  
i) cooperation on the environmentally sustainable use of MNs (Project 9).  
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 TGS have the mandate to advise the TC229 on how to include sustainability within its strategic priorities.  
11
 Such documents are usually approved while the subject matter is still under development or when there is no immediate 
agreement to publish an International Standard .  
12
 See also Hatto, P . and MacLachlan, S. (2010). Standardising nanotechnologies, Available from: 
http://www.iom3.org/news/standardising-nanotechnologies;  
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It is interesting to note that each project is carried out by specific steering groups (SGs) [67]. These 
groups are composed of experts nominated by the delegation heads participating in the work of the 
OECD/WPMN.  
WPMN is a subsidiary body established under the Chemicals Committee. This Committee 
functions under the OECD Environment, Health, and Safety Division and consists of governmental 
officials from the OECD countries responsible for chemicals management. As such, WPMN 
encourages the participation of observers and invited experts that participate in the work of the 
Chemicals Committee. There are 34 OECD member countries that participate in the work of the 
WPMN. Member countries drive the agenda and the output of the WPMN, while financing a major 
part of its work and voting on proposals and policy recommendations. These countries are 
represented at the WPMN meetings by the delegation heads13, each of whom is drawn from their 
national agencies responsible for chemicals regulation and the safety of human health and the 
environment. Nominated delegates are selected by consensus on the basis of merit, and their roles 
and duties are set up by the Committee and the WPMN. 
Since its establishment in 2006, there have been ten meetings of the OECD/WPMN, which 
have been supplemented with several workshops, expert meetings and conferences [53]. In addition 
to these actors, the OECD has taken several steps to establish close relationships with nonmember 
countries like Russia, China, Thailand, South Africa, India, the E.U. Commission (EC), U.N. bodies, 
ISO, WHO and other stakeholder groups such as those represented through the Trade Union 
Advisory Committee (TUAC) and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC). The 
wide range of actors emphasizes clearly the drive within the OECD to opt for a multistakeholder 
representation and secure support for its policy recommendations through a broader range of 
experts. This also allows us to assess the WPMN as a transnational arrangement. 
With regards to the outcomes, it is important to note that WPMN does not have regulatory 
power, but it serves as a center for international collaboration and policy dialogue, building 
“communities of practice that promote information sharing and harmonization” [4:291, 34]. The key 
achievements to date are the Sponsorship Programme14, the OECD Database on Manufactured 
Nanomaterials to Inform and Analyse EHS Research Activities, and the Preliminary Guidance on 
Sample Preparation and Dosimetry for the Safety of Nanomaterials [67, 68, 69].  
  
1.4.3. International Risk Governance Council (IRGC): is an independent foundation that 
was initially founded by the Swiss government, to help the understanding and management of 
emerging global risks [74]. Since the beginning of 2005 the Council has also been working actively 
on nanotechnology issues. The key objectives of IRGC in relation to nanotechnology are: “to 
develop and make available specific advice for improving risk governance; to provide a neutral and 
constructive platform on the most appropriate approaches to handling the risks and opportunities of 
nanotechnology and to enable all actors to reach a global consensus” [74:6]. 
The key bodies within the IRGC are the Board Members, Advisory Committee and the 
Scientific & Technical Council (S&TC). Members of the Board are drawn from governments, 
industry, science and non-governmental organisations.15 The Advisory Committee is the key body, 
which comprises of individual members (17 members) appointed by the Board to act as advisors and 
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 These delegates serve as the main contacting point to the Working Party, and provide information on the experts that 
are nominated by member countries to participate in the work of the SGs (see Kica and Bowman, 2012).  
14
 The Sponsorship Programme, as one of the key outcomes of the WPMN, gathered a number of countries and the BIAC, 
who volunteered to sponsor and cosponsor the testing of one or more MNs and provide test data, reference or testing 
materials to the lead sponsors.  
15
 The members of the board come from USA, Portugal, Switzerland and China.  
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make proposals to the S&TC on the possible issues that need to be addressed by the IRGC. These 
members come from USA, Germany, France, Belgium, Korea, Switzerland, China and Canada. The 
S&TC is the leading scientific authority of the foundation. It comprises experts form a range of 
scientific and organisational background, who review the scientific quality of the IRGC work and its 
deliverables. The participation of these actors at the IRGC is voluntary, but there is less available 
information on how they are selected and how the decision making process is structured in this 
arrangement.  
The IRGC’s nanotechnology programme is a key forum for dialogue and is supported 
mainly by the Swiss Reinsurance Company, EPA and the US Department of State [49]. To tackle 
issues of nanotechnology the IRGC, and the S&TC in particular, proposed the establishment of the 
working group on nanotechnology to provide an independent and cross-disciplinary approach to 
nanotechnology risks and hazards. The group has focused on two projects: on the risk governance of 
nanotechnology (in 2005) and on nanotechnology applications in food and cosmetics (2007). These 
projects were led by expert bodies consisting of recognized subject experts in the field of 
nanotechnology and risk governance, who prepared and reviewed the project reports [49]. For 
instance, the first project was led by Dr. Mihail Roco of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and 
a team of scientific experts coming from universities, research centers, governmental bodies, 
laboratories.  
Over a period of two-years, the IRGC undertook two expert workshops (May 2005 and 
January 2006) [48, 49]. During the second workshop, the IRGC working group also organized four 
surveys on the implications of nanotechnology with stakeholders coming from research 
organisations, standardisation organisations, nanotechnology start-ups, NGOs. The aim of the 
surveys was to identify the organisation interest in nanotechnology research, the governance gaps as 
well as measures needed to address potential risks. These activities resulted in the publication of the 
“White Paper on Nanotechnology Risk Governance” in 2006 and the “Policy Brief: 
Recommendations for a global, coordinated approach to the governance of potential risks” in 2007 
[17, 49]. 
The White Paper and the Policy Brief suggest a regulatory framework, which anticipates two 
frames for four generations of nanotechnology. Frame one includes the first generation of 
nanostructures (the steady function nanostructures), which have stable behaviour and do not 
constitute excessive risks. Frame two involves the second generation (active function 
nanostructures), the third generation (systems of nanosystems) and the fourth generation of 
nanostructures (heterogeneous molecular nanosystems). In the second frame are involved 
nanostructures which change their design and it is more difficult to predict their behaviour [49]. It is 
important to note that these deliberations have been amongst the first publications to provide 
detailed recommendations for the risk governance of nanotechnology [49]. They recommend 
national and international decision makers who are involved in the nanotechnology risk issues “to 
improve knowledge base, strengthen risk management structures and processes, promote stakeholder 
communication and collaboration, and ensure social benefits and acceptance” [49:15]. As such, the 
White Paper and the Policy Brief have become widely cited reference points in various reports and 
documents [17, 61, 72].  
1.4.4. International Council on Nanotechnology (ICON): was established in 2003. Based 
in Rice University, ICON started initially within the program of the federally funded Center for 
Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN). Nowadays, its activities extend beyond 
CBEN to include other national and international centers. ICON has been actively involved on 
tackling issues related to the field of nanotechnology [72]. Its mission is to “assess, reduce and 
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communicate information regarding the potential environmental and health risks of nanotechnology, 
while maximizing its societal values” [50:3].  
The key bodies of ICON are the Director and the Executive Director, who are responsible for 
managing the internal coordination of the Council and ensuring an effective external presence. The 
Council is largely funded by industry16 and it has established an Advisory Board which is composed 
of prominent nanomaterial safety experts coming from industry, government agencies, academic 
institutions and nongovernmental groups. Participation in ICON is voluntary and non-compensated, 
and there are around 27 members participating in the Advisory Board coming from France, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Executive 
Committee, consisting of the Director and Executive Director, has the ultimate authority over 
ICON’s finances, the membership of the Advisory Board and of the setting of new committees [50].  
ICON has been working on several projects related to nanotechnology such as the 
International Assessment of Research Needs for Nanotechnology Environment, Health and Safety; 
Current Practices for Occupational Handling of Nanomaterials and the Good NanoGuide. The main 
objectives of the first two projects have been to: a) facilitate the documentation of current best 
practices for identifying and managing risks that come during the production, handling, use and 
disposal of nanomaterials, and b) prioritize research needs related to the classification nanomaterials 
[50]. As such they have resulted in several workshops and conferences. ICON’s third project - the 
GoodNanoGuide – is an internet based collaboration platform designed to help experts in the field of 
nanotechnology to exchange ideas on how best to handle nanomaterials safely [58]. The key 
objective of the GoodNanoGuide is to establish an open forum that complements other 
nanotechnology information projects by providing up-to-date information on good practices for 
handling of nanomaterials in an occupational setting. The GoodNanoGuide is freely accessible for 
everyone, but only experts who are members of the GoodNanoGuide are able to post information [58]. 
The forum has attracted a wide range of stakeholders to collaborate and contribute at both intellectual 
and financial levels. However, according to its Director the main weakness of the GoodNanoGuide 
is its lack of sustainability in a down economy, as well as its reliance on industry funds only [4]. The 
platform was set in 2008 and it is still in a beta version.  
1.4.5. Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS): was established in 1994 in 
the International Conference of Chemicals Safety. The main objective in establishing IFCS was to 
create an “over-arching framework through which national governments, intergovernmental 
organisations and NGOs could work together and build consensus to promote chemical safety and 
address the environmentally sound management of chemicals” [51:2]. 
The idea to establish IFCS was created in 1991, during the preparations for the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNED). The Forum is under the 
administration of WHO, which also provides the secretariat for IFCS. Participation in the IFCS is 
open to governmental participants (which include all member state of the UN and its specialized 
agencies); intergovernmental participants (including participants representing subregional, regional, 
political and economic groups of countries involved in chemical safety); and non-governmental 
participants (including NGOs concerned with science, health and workers interest). Participation is 
voluntary and supported by the members. The work of IFCS is organized in sessions at intervals of 
2-3 years. To achieve its objectives, IFCS has established the Forum Standing Committee (FCS) to 
provide advice and assistance during the preparations of Forum meetings, monitor progress on the 
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work of the IFCS and assist with regional efforts. FCS is composed of 25 participants, who serve as 
representatives of the views of participant countries in respective IFCS regions, NGOs or 
intergovernmental organisations.  
Since its creation IFCS has held six meetings/sessions. In its sixth session in 2008, IFCS 
considered for the first time the opportunities and challenges of nanotechnology and MNs. The final 
outcome of this meeting was the Dakar Statement on Manufactured Nanomaterials calling for more 
international cooperation in information sharing and risk assessment [17]. The meeting had around 
200 delegates, representing 70 governments, 12 intergovernmental organisations and 39 NGOs. 
Amongst other issues, two main items were discussed in this session. The primary issue was whether 
to distinguish between nanotechnologies and MNs and to integrate them into the IFCS VI agenda. 
 Whereas most NGOs and developing countries argued for including both the MNs and 
nanotechnology, European countries supported the inclusion of only MNs in the IFCS agenda. As a 
result, delegates agreed to include a preambular paragraph in the Dakar statement acknowledging 
the need to address the safety aspect of nanotechnologies “while limiting the focus of the statement 
on safety aspects of nanomaterials only” [52:5]. Amongst other recommendations the Dakar 
Statement called the governments and the industry to apply the “precautionary principle throughput 
the lifecycle of manufactured nanomaterials” [52:12]. The Statement recommended the evaluation 
of “the feasibility of developing global codes of conduct in a timely manner” and the provision of 
information “through product labeling, websites, databases […] and cooperative actions between 
governments and stakeholders” [52:6]. These recommendations provided an important contribution 
for advancing the sound management of chemicals globally and were sent to the International 
Conference on Chemicals Management (ICCM) for consideration and further actions [24, 52]. 
Another key agenda item during the sixth meeting of the IFCS was the future of this Forum. In light 
of the agreement on the Strategic Approach to International Chemical Management (SAICM) in 
2006, the delegates of IFCS agreed to invite the ICCM (during its second session - ICCM2) to 
integrate the Forum as an advisory body into the ICCM [24]. This invitation was crucial for IFCS, 
since the decision of the ICCM2 to reject the request of the IFCS put into question the existence and 
the potential of this Forum to contribute to the field of nanotechnology. This is further elaborated in 
the next Section.  
 
1.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
This paper aimed to assess the potential of different transnational governance arrangements in the 
field of nanotechnology and to explain the key factors that drive the emergence of these 
arrangements. It highlights the growing importance and relevance of five TGAs, such as: 
ISO/TC229, OECD/WPMN, IRGC, ICON and IFCS. Building upon current debates on the modes of 
governance and transnationalisation, the paper developed a framework to determine the main 
attributes of TGAs. This framework proved to be very useful for understanding different types of 
governance arrangements that have emerged in the field of nanotechnology as well as their potential 
to contribute to this emerging field. A comparative look at these arrangements suggests the 
following: First, in the field of nanotechnology TGAs have all taken various initiatives to assemble 
the needed competencies while combining the expertise and experiences of multiple actors. Yet, the 
relative input that states, NGOs and firms have in these arrangements differs considerably. We 
elaborate this further in below. Furthermore, the arrangements differ considerably in terms of their 
institutional structure, organisational goals and substantive scope, all of which impact their potential 
to contribute effectively to the governance of nanotechnology. 
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 Second, all of the arrangements reviewed in this paper have engaged in agenda setting and 
related preliminary steps. For instance, ICON and IRGC have focused mainly to internationalize the 
nanotechnology safety and regulatory debate. They have served as leading fora for gathering 
information on the risks of nanoscale materials to inform future regulation, and supporting 
coordination amongst decision makers on handling these issues [17]. IFCS was a pioneer in 
identifying nanotechnology as an important part of the international chemical safety agenda. It 
aimed at sharing information and promoting coordination on nanotechnology and MNs to increase 
awareness on the potential benefits, challenges and risks posed by nanotechnology. In addition to 
health and safety issues, the leaders of the ISO/TC229 have addressed other issues that are essential 
to nanotechnology regulation, such as nomenclature, specifications and measurement. The 
OECD/WPMN has also served as the main forum for gathering and exchanging information on the 
risk assessment of MNs. Therefore, these arrangements differ in their functions, but also on the 
normative scope of the issues that they address.  
 This leads us to our third point. A comparative look at these arrangements suggests that 
some arrangements seem to be narrower, focusing almost entirely on certain products (i.e. IFCS on 
safety aspect of MNs), settings (ICON - and GoodNanoGuide in particular - on workplace) or 
activities (IRGC on risk governance) [4]. OECD/WPMN concentrates on human health and 
environmental safety implications (including risk assessment and safety testing) of MNs [68]. 
ISO/TC229 addresses a broader range of products, setting and activities. With its standards, TC229 
provides terminology and nomenclature, measurement techniques, calibration procedures, reference 
materials, test methods to detect and identify nanoparticles, occupational health protocols relevant to 
nanotechnologies as well as risk assessment tools - which aim to support regulation, research, 
commercialization, and trade of the materials and products at the nanoscale.  
 A number of these arrangements (such as ISO/TC229, OECD/WPMN) have also adopted 
norms that call relevant actors to act in accordance to certain standards. In this way, these 
arrangements have started to move towards the negotiation stage. ISO/TC229 for instance has been 
able to negotiate several standards, as well as technical specifications and recommendations (e.g. 
ISO/TS27687; ISO/TR 12885). From a governance point of view, these deliberations may provide 
the “best available options to industries requested to demonstrate product compliance with 
regulation” [32:17]. The Sponsorship Programme has also served as an incentive for countries to 
collaborate, share best practices, and follow a consistent approach with regards to the testing of 
specific endpoints of representative MNs. The substantive scope of these deliberations differs, with 
the TC229 standards and technical specifications providing practical information, and being more 
concrete and complete [4]. 
Fourth, a comparative look on these arrangements emphasizes that ISO and OECD seem to 
have the highest potential to contribute to the governance of nanotechnology. In our view, there are 
two key factors that contribute to this. On the one hand, it is the high level of institutional structure 
that characterizes these governance arrangements. On the other hand, it is the collaboration and the 
(political) support that these arrangements have ensured with key actors in Europe [26, 32]. 
Regarding the first point, our case studies emphasize that nanotechnology transantional governance 
arrangements differ considerably in terms of their structure, membership and organisational goals. 
TC229 and WPMN are the most organized working groups with secretariats, clear rules of 
membership, governance structure and decision making procedures [35, 54]. Furthermore, they have 
organized regular meetings for their members to share knowledge and information and developed 
concrete roadmaps that guide future actions and strategies. Such a well-defined structure has helped 
these arrangements to contribute substantially to shaping nanotechnology regulatory agenda at 
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transantional level, promote collaboration and harmonization, and establish concrete regulatory 
governance mechanisms (e.g. standards, guidelines or other regulatory options) for nanotechnology 
[4, 32, 35, 54].  
ISO is amongst the most recognized international organisations, which has strongest linkages 
with key experts and dominant industrial actors coming from more than 40 countries around the 
world. However, to ensure representation of other stakeholders TC229 has established liaisons with 
other actors representing government, trade unions, consumer associations, NGOs and the EU. In 
addition to this, the establishment of the Task Groups (i.e. TGS and TGCSDN) appears to have been 
one approach to opening up the membership of TC229, and thus making its actions accountable to a 
broader range of actors. Since 2005, ISO/TC229 has been able to broaden its activities, membership 
and the diversity of actors involved in the process [35, 36, 53]. ISO/TC229 plenary meetings involve 
a wide range of practitioners, industrial hygienists, pharmacologists, toxicologists and 
ecotoxicologists, chemists and physicists who exchange knowledge and contribute substantially to 
establishing international standards [53].  
In a similar vein, OECD/WPMN and its SGs are highly structured. WPMN has strong 
linkages with national regulatory agencies, which is not surprising given the intergovernmental 
nature of the OECD. However, the inclusion of high level experts nominated by member countries 
has helped SGs to proceed faster in developing well-defined strategies for tracking nanotechnology 
policy developments. OECD has also developed liaisons with other industrial actors, trade unions, 
NGOs as well as European Commission. Such activities are crucial for these arrangements to ensure 
stakeholder representation, but also the legitimacy and acceptability for their actions. While serving 
as a center for policy dialogue between high level governmental officials and nongovernmental 
experts, there is the potential for the outputs of the OECD/WPMN to lay the groundwork for 
collective agreements and contribute to overcoming the uncertainties and regulatory puzzles related 
to nanomaterials and risk assessment practices [12, 54]. This is not without precedent; for example it 
is widely acknowledged that the OECD Chemicals Committee played a leading role in promoting 
harmonized chemical control policies through the system of the Mutual Acceptance Data (MAD) 
[53, 85]. 
 Regarding the support that these arrangements have ensured with key actors in Europe, 
perhaps of greatest importance is the support of the EU members and the EU Commission. In 2007, 
the European Commission Communication on the Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: An action 
plan for Europe 2005-2009, stated that OECD/WPMN and ISO/TC229 are “principal forums for the 
coordination of activities at the international level” and that “the Commission, the European Bodies 
and Member States are expected to continue contributing to these international efforts” [30:10]. The 
Council’s conclusions on Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies also stated that, “ the Commission 
needs to take into account in its policy making all activities within the OECD (e.g. definitions, 
nomenclature, risk management)” [26:428]. Regarding, the role of international standards in the 
field of nanotechnology, in 2010 the EU Commission addressed a mandate to the European 
Standardisation Bodies (ESOs) (i.e. CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) to develop European standards 
related to the characterization and toxicity testing of the nanomaterials, as well as to the 
occupational handling and exposure [32].17 An important element of the Mandate is that the EC 
requests the ESOs to develop and adopt European standards in support of the European policies and 
legislations, while taking into account and giving priority to the existing ISO standards [32]. 
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Furthermore, the Mandate asks the ESOs to work in close collaboration with ISO and OECD. These 
statements indicate clearly that the EU not only is aware of the work undertaken by ISO and OECD, 
but it also suggests that these arrangements and their deliverables are relevant and can contribute to 
the nanotechnology regulatory debate in the EU.18  
Other governance arrangements analyzed in this paper, have also been able to ensure 
collaboration with influential stakeholders. IFCS for instance managed to provide equal 
representation to state actors, NGOs and intergovernmental actors. Regarding its structure, IFCS has 
the most informal structure. IFCS operates under the intergovernmental regime of the WHO, but it 
considers itself as a “non-institutional arrangement”, a forum that builds on the loose grouping of 
interested parties and experts, who come together to integrate national and international efforts to 
promote chemical safety [65:886]. However, even though being one of the key actors to consider the 
issue of nanotechnology within the international chemicals agenda, the rejection of the ICMM2 to 
include IFCS as an advisory body put into question the ability of this forum to contribute effectively 
to nanotechnology governance [24]. Furthermore, in the final resolution on the emerging issues the 
ICMM2 recognized the potential health and environmental issues related to nanotechnologies and 
MNs, but no reference was made to the Dakar Statement. In light of these events, in the last session 
of the Forum (Forum IV) the FCS agreed to suspend its work for the foreseeable future [24].  
ICON and IRGC have a moderate level of institutionalization with both having established 
several workshops and a network of growing stakeholders. Both of these arrangements focus on 
nanotechnology risk governance, but none of these arrangements aspires to go beyond mere 
information exchange and international coordination. The IRGC in the initial phases of its work on 
nanotechnology developed an ad-hoc working group on nanotechnology to provide an independent 
and cross-disciplinary approach to nanotechnology risks and hazards. However, this group does not 
have the same structure with clear rules for membership, formalized decision making structures as 
well as strategies for future work like ISO/TC229 for instance. Its Advisory Committee is 
representative of a less number of European countries, but it has the support of EPA. In 2006, IRGC 
organized a Conference to promote stakeholder dialogue and feedback on the IRGC White Paper 
[47, 48]. What we can observe here is the participation of actors from regulatory agencies (e.g. 
DEFRA) as well as industrial actors (e.g. DuPont). The inclusion of these actors combined with the 
support that EPA has for IRGC can contribute to increasing the relevance of the Council’s 
recommendations in the field of nanotechnology. ICON, on the other hand has also a moderate level 
of institutionalization. Compared to ISO and OECD, its working groups are less structured with few 
members and less formalized decision making strategies. The Council started initially as an affiliate 
programme of the CBEN center at Risse University, but it has been able to build a network of 
growing stakeholders. Council has also been working with EPA to review the best practices for 
nanomaterial safety [48]. GoodNanoGuide is one of the main outcomes of ICON which still 
continues to be in a beta version [48]. Whereas the relevance of IRGC and ICON has been 
mentioned in some documents [28, 29, 61], none of them has been involved formally by the EU 
institutions. Furthermore, compared to ISO/TC229 and OECD/WPMN, these arrangements have not 
established any formal collaboration with the EU institutions or Commission.  
 In conclusion, our analysis on nanotechnology transnational governance arrangements 
suggest that IRGC and ICON have the potential to become important actors on the transnational 
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governance of nanotechnology risk regulation. However, the institutional structure, the actors, the 
normative scope, the political support and the strategies incorporated by ISO/TC229 and 
OECD/WPMN places these arrangements in a better position to take a lead on the transnational  
debates of nanotechnology governance. The huge potential of these arrangements, which operate 
beyond the state level, brings forward many concerns. In these arrangements the rule making 
authority rests on the hands of those who operate beyond the state level and are “neither elected nor 
managed by elected officials” [83]. They build on non-hierarchical steering principles and are 
characterized by interaction amongst various public and private actors. As such, they have become 
the “hard case” for legitimacy [9], raising therefore many questions over the clear lines of 
accountability, stakeholder representation, roots of decision-making and reasons for social 
acceptability. Such questions are beyond the scope of this paper, but pose an urgent need for further 
research.19 
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